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ABSTRACT
This paper introduces a differentially private mechanism to protect
the information exchanged during the coordination of the sequen-
tial market clearing of electricity and natural gas systems. The
coordination between these sequential and interdependent markets
represents a classic Stackelberg game and relies on the exchange
of sensitive information between the system agents, including the
supply and demand bids in each market or the characteristics of
the systems. The paper is motivated by the observation that tradi-
tional differential privacy mechanisms are unsuitable for the prob-
lem of interest: The perturbation introduced by these mechanisms
fundamentally changes the underlying optimization problem and
even leads to unsatisfiable instances. To remedy such limitation,
the paper introduces the Privacy-Preserving Stackelberg Mechanism
(PPSM), a framework that enforces the notions of consistency and
fidelity of the privacy-preserving information to the original prob-
lem objective. The PPSM has strong properties: It complies with
the notion of differential privacy and ensures that the outcomes
of the privacy-preserving coordination mechanisms are close-to-
optimality for each agent. The fidelity property is analyzed by
providing theoretical guarantees on the cost of privacy of PPSM and
experimental results on several gas and electricity market bench-
marks based on a real case study demonstrate the effectiveness of
the approach.
KEYWORDS
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1 INTRODUCTION
The liberalization of the energy sectors along with the growing
efforts to achieve a sustainable energy future have lead to an in-
creased competition and the decentralization of decision-making in
energy systems, such as electricity, heat, and natural gas systems
[32]. As a result, the coordination among multiple rational agents
has become central to achieve efficient and cost-effective operations
of the overall energy system. In particular, the growing share of
flexible gas-fired power plants (GFPPs) at the interface between elec-
tricity and natural gas systems creates strong interdependencies
between their respective markets [1, 31].
The coordination of sequential and interdependent agents in the
energy system, such as electricity and district heating markets
∗Authors names listed alphabetically. All authors have equal contributions.
[26, 27], electricity transmission and distribution system operators
[18, 23, 36], or aggregators and consumers [29, 37], has traditionally
beenmodeled as a Stackelberg game [34].While this coordination ap-
proach brings substantial economical benefits to the power system,
it also requires the exchange of proprietary information between
the agents in order to achieve an optimal strategy. Relevant data
may represent the costs of producers or the loads of consumers,
or technical characteristics of the network. Such information is
however considered sensitive as it can provide a competitive ad-
vantage over other strategic agents in the energy system, and may
incur financial losses. Additionally, a breach of privacy on these
parameters may benefit an attacker. For instance, [25] analyzed the
impact of an attacker who manipulates the information exchange
between the aggregator and consumers in the power system and
showed the loss in social welfare for both agents.
To address this issue, several privacy-preserving framework have
been proposed. In particular, Differential Privacy (DP) [9] captures
a desirable privacy property of computations over a dataset. It
allows to measure and bound the risk associated with an individual
participation to an analysis task. Differential privacy algorithms
rely on the injection of carefully calibrated noise to the output of
a computation. They can thus be used to obfuscate the sensitive
data exchanged by the system agents in the market. However, as
the paper observes in Section 7, when these privacy-preserving
mechanisms are used as input to complex optimization problems, as
in the case of Stackelberg games, they may produce results that are
fundamentally different from those obtained on the original data:
They often transform the nature of the underlying optimization
problem of the agents, and even lead to severe feasibility issues.
As a consequence, despite its strong theoretical foundations,
industrial adoption of differential privacy has remained limited.
Large-scale deployments were carried out by large data owners,
such as Google [11] and Apple [5]. These applications, however, do
not involve data used for solving complex optimization problems,
but rather for evaluating a pre-defined set of queries, e.g., the count
of individuals satisfying specific criteria for statistical analysis.
This paper is motivated by the desire of solving complex co-
ordination problems arising in the sequential and interdependent
markets operating the electricity and gas systems, while protecting
the privacy of the demand information exchanged in these markets.
Contributions. This paper makes several contributions to the
state of the art. Firstly, it introduces the Privacy-Preserving Stack-
elberg Mechanism (PPSM) for the coordination of electricity and
natural gas market agents. The approach relies on hierarchical op-
timization to model the coordination problem and on the notion of
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differential privacy to protect the exchange of proprietary informa-
tion between the agents. Secondly, it introduces two optimization-
based approaches that allow the PPSM to achieve fidelity of the
privacy-preserving exchanged information with respect to the orig-
inal problem. These approaches rely on fidelity constraints on the
primal and dual decision variables of the agents. Thirdly, it dis-
cusses theoretical guarantees on the PPSM cost of privacy. Finally,
the approach is validated on a real test case for the Northeastern
United States [7] and show to bring up to two orders of magnitude
error reduction over competitor privacy-preserving mechanisms.
2 PRELIMINARIES
2.1 Coordination of Sequential Markets
The strategies of two sequential and interdependent agents, such as
market operators in energy systems, represent a classic Stackelberg
game [34]. In this game-theoretical framework, the leader, i.e. the
first market clearing, optimizes its decisions while anticipating on
the reaction of the follower, i.e. the second market clearing.
The leader actions impact the reaction of the follower, through its
feasible decision space, which in turn impacts the leader objective
and feasible space. As a result, the leader strategy in Stackelberg
games can be modeled as a hierarchical optimization problem [16]:
S = min
x L,x F ,yF
OL
(
xL ,xF ,yF ,DL
)
(1a)
s.t. xL ∈ ZL
(
xF ,yF ,DL
)
(1b)
(xF ,yF ) = primal, dual sol. of min
x F
OF
(
xF ,DF
)
(1c)
s.t. xF ∈ ZF
(
xL ,DF
)
, (1d)
where xL represents the vector of decision variables of the leader,
and xF and yF the vectors of primal and dual decision variables
of the follower. Additionally, DL and DF denote the vectors of pa-
rameters in the leader and follower problems, respectively. The
follower parameters may be differentiated between public and sen-
sitive, represented by the vectorsDP andDS , respectively, such that
DF =
[
DP ,DS
]
. Taking these parameters as input, the upper-level
problemminimizes the leader objective cost (1a), constrained by the
feasible space of the leader decisions (1b), and the reaction of the
follower in the lower-level problem (1c) and (1d). The lower-level
problem minimizes the follower objective cost (1c), constrained by
the feasible space of the follower decisions (1d).
Coordination Variables. Note that, the leader decision vari-
ables appear as fixed parameters in the expression of the follower
feasible space ZF . In return, the lower-level problem provides
feedback on the follower decision variables to the upper-level prob-
lem through its objective function OL and feasible spaceZL . The
variables shared between the follower and the leader are called
coordination variables. These variables may be classified into two
categories, i.e., primal and dual variables. In the context of the co-
ordination between two energy markets, primal coordination vari-
ables may represent the quantity of energy dispatched, while dual
coordination variables may represent the market-clearing prices.
The remainder of the paper details the coordination between
natural gas and electricity markets to motivate and illustrate the
privacy-preserving mechanisms proposed. However, the methods
developed may apply more generally to any type of coordination
mechanism between sequential and interdependent agents.
2.2 Privacy Goal
The coordination mechanisms (1) requires information exchange
between the leader and the follower. The paper focuses on the prob-
lem arising when the follower parameters DF contains sensitive
information DS that should not be revealed to the leader. In the
case of electricity and natural gas markets, these parameters may
represent the costs of producers or the demand profile of consumers.
If released, they can provide a competitive advantage to the leader,
or other strategic agents in the energy system, and may result in
financial losses for the follower.
The privacy goal is to ensure that the sensitive information DS
contained in the follower parameters DF is not breached during
the coordination process described in Problem (1). The next section
introduces a formal notion that will be used to achieve this goal.
2.3 Differential Privacy
Differential privacy [9] (DP) is a rigorous privacy notion used to
protect the participation disclosure of an individual in a computa-
tion. A randomized mechanismM :D→R with domain D and
rangeR is ϵ-differential private if, for any output response O ⊆ R
and any two neighboring datasets D,D ′ ∈ D differing in at most
one individual (written D ∼ D ′),
Pr [M(D) ∈ O] ≤ exp(ϵ) Pr [M(D ′) ∈ O]. (2)
The parameter ϵ ≥ 0 is the privacy loss of the mechanisms, with
values close to 0 denoting strong privacy.
DP satisfies several important properties, including composability
and immunity to post-processing. Composability ensures that a
combination of differentially private mechanisms preserve privacy.
Theorem 2.1 (Seqential Composition). The composition
(M1(D), . . . ,Mk (D)) of a collection {Mi }ki=1 of ϵi -differential pri-
vate mechanisms satisfies (∑ki=1 ϵi )-differential privacy.
Immunity to post-processing, ensures that privacy guarantees
are preserved by arbitrary post-processing steps.
Theorem 2.2 (Post-Processing [10]). LetM be an ϵ-differential
private mechanism and д be an arbitrary mapping from the set of pos-
sible outputs to an arbitrary set. Then, д ◦M is ϵ-differential private.
In private data analysis settings, a function Q (also called query)
from a data set D ∈ D to a result set R ⊆ Rn can be made differen-
tially private by injecting random noise to its output. The amount
of noise depends on the sensitivity of the query, denoted by ∆Q
and defined as ∆Q = maxD∼D′ ∥Q(D) −Q(D ′)∥1 . In other words,
the sensitivity of a query is the maximum l1-distance between the
query outputs of any two neighboring datasets D and D ′.
While the classical DP notion protects the individuals presence
into a dataset, many applications involve components whose pres-
ence is public information. In the problem of interest, for instance,
the gas market participants are known and have non-negative
demands. However, the demand values are highly sensitive, as men-
tioned in the previous section. To protect the values associated with
these components, the concept of indistinguishability is reviewed.
PPSM: A Privacy-Preserving Stackelberg Mechanism
Indistinguishability was introduced in [3] to protect user lo-
cations in the Euclidean plane and then generalized in [8, 21] to
arbitrary metric spaces. Consider a dataset D to which n individu-
als contribute their data xi and α > 0. An adjacency relation that
captures the data variation of a single individual is defined as:
D ∼α D ′ ⇐⇒ ∃i : d(xi ,x ′i ) ≤ α ∧ ∀j , i : d(x j ,x ′j ) = 0,
where d is a distance function on D . Such adjacency definition is
useful to hide individual participation up to some quantity α . In
our application, α-indistinguishability allows customers to reveal
gas demand profiles that hide the real consumption by a factor of
α .
Given ϵ ≥ 0,α > 0, a randomized mechanism M : D → R
with domain D and rangeR is α-indistinguishable ϵ-differentially
private (α-indistinguishable for short) if, for any event O ⊆ R and
any pair D ∼α D ′, (D,D ′ ∈ D ), Equation (2) holds.
3 THE PPS PROBLEM
The Privacy-Preserving Stackelber (PPS) problem establishes the
fundamental desiderata to be delivered by an obfuscation mecha-
nism. It operates on the follower sensitive parametersDS exchanged
to ensure coordination between the leader and the follower in reso-
lution of Problem S (Equation (1)).
Definition 3.1. Given a Stackelber game S and positive real num-
bers α ,η, the PPS problem produces a problem S˜ such that:
(1) Privacy: S˜ satisfies α-indistinguishability for the sensitive
parameters DS .
(2) Fidelity: The privacy-preserving optimal objective value of
each agent, i.e. the leader and/or the follower, is close to
its original optimal objective value, and the variation in
objective value is bounded by parameter η.
(3) Consistency: The privacy-preserving follower subproblem
satisfies the problem constraints (1d).
The fidelity and consistency conditions make sure that the
privacy-preserving coordination mechanism is feasible, and pre-
serve the original cost of the agents.
Prior to introducing a mechanism that achieves the desired con-
ditions above, the paper discusses the application of interest in
details: The coordination of sequential electricity and natural gas
markets.
4 STACKELBERG GAME FOR THE
COORDINATION OF ELECTRICITY AND
GAS MARKETS
The coordination between electricity and natural gasmarkets can be
modeled as a Stackelberg game between a leader, i.e. the electricity
unit commitment (UC), and a follower, i.e. the sequential clearing
of the electricity market (EM) and the natural gas market (GM), as
recently proposed in [7]. This Stackelberg coordination problem is
schematically depicted at the bottom of Figure 1 (which excludes
the privacy-preserving mechanism), and referred to as gas-aware
UC (GAUC). It represents the sequential order of the agents decision
making and the interdependencies between them.
GAUC Coordination variables (z). The GAUC is responsible
for committing the bids of the electricity market participants, while
anticipating the impact of these decisions on the follower, i.e. the
sequential EM and GM clearings. Due to the participation of gas-
fired power plants (GFPP)s at the interface between electricity and
natural gas systems, the commitment z∗ of the selected bids of
GFPPs by the UC impacts both the EM and GM clearings.
Firstly, the EM uses the bids commitment z∗ of the EM partici-
pants as input and dispatches these selected bids to maximize the
social welfare of the power system. Secondly, the GM dispatches
its participants bids in order to maximize the social welfare in the
natural gas system.
EM and GM Coordination variables (xe and yд ). The elec-
tricity dispatch xe∗of GFPPs is directly linked to their gas consump-
tion γд∗, which is used as input to the GM clearing problem. In
return, the reaction of the follower, i.e., the electricity dispatch xe
and gas prices yд , are accounted in the leader decisions through
the objective cost Ouc and feasible space of the UC problemZuc .
Firstly, the UC problem objective accounts for the dispatch cost
of the electricity bids. Secondly, the UC problem feasible space
accounts for bid-validity constraints which embed the interdepen-
dencies between the gas prices yд and the marginal electricity
production cost of GFPPs. In practice, these constraints enforce
the price of the last selected GFPPs bid to be no larger than their
marginal electricity production cost. These bidirectional interde-
pendencies between the leader and the follower represent a classic
Stackelberg game.
GAUC problem. Therefore, the compact formulation of the
GAUC as a hierarchical optimization problem is as follows:
Puc = min
z∈{0,1}N
x e ,yд≥0
Ouc = cuc⊤z + ce⊤xe (3a)
s.t. z ∈ Zuc (3b)
Aucz + Bucyд ≥ buc (3c)
xe ,yд ∈ primal and dual sol. of (4), (3d)
where N is the dimensionality of the commitment vector. The
leader’s objective aims at minimizing the electricity system operat-
ing cost, which includes no-load and start-up costs cuc⊤z, and the
cost of dispatching the electricity bids ce⊤xe , constrained by the
techno-economic characteristics of electricity suppliers (3b), and
the bid-validity constraints (3c).
EM and GM Clearing Problems. Furthermore, due to the se-
quential order of EM and GM clearings, the follower’s problem (3d)
can be expressed as a hierarchical optimization problem, such that:
Pe = min
x e ,yд
Oe = ce⊤xe (4a)
s.t. xe ∈ Ze (4b)
Aexe + Bez ≥ be (4c)
yд ∈ dual sol. of Pд = min
x д
Oд = cд⊤xд (5a)
s.t. xд ∈ Zд (5b)
Aдxд + Bдxe = dд . (5c)
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gas demands
Gas Market Participants 
xe⇤
<latexit sha1_base64="jqpjbYtTySX4HmdBmaQodQGuMf4=">AAACAnicbVC7SgNBFL3rM8ZX1NJmMAhiEXZF0 MIiYGMZwTwgiWF2MpsMmccyMyuGZTt/wVZ7O7H1R2z9EifJFpp44MLhnHs5lxPGnBnr+1/e0vLK6tp6YaO4ubW9s1va228YlWhC60RxpVshNpQzSeuWWU5bsaZYhJw2w9H1xG8+UG2Yknd2HNOuwAPJIkawdVK7E4r0MbtP6WnWK5X9ij 8FWiRBTsqQo9YrfXf6iiSCSks4NqYd+LHtplhbRjjNip3E0BiTER7QtqMSC2q66fTlDB07pY8ipd1Ii6bq74sUC2PGInSbAtuhmfcm4r9eKOaSbXTZTZmME0slmQVHCUdWoUkfqM80JZaPHcFEM/c7IkOsMbGutaIrJZivYJE0ziqBXwlu z8vVq7yeAhzCEZxAABdQhRuoQR0IKHiGF3j1nrw37937mK0uefnNAfyB9/kDAomYCA==</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="jqpjbYtTySX4HmdBmaQodQGuMf4=">AAACAnicbVC7SgNBFL3rM8ZX1NJmMAhiEXZF0 MIiYGMZwTwgiWF2MpsMmccyMyuGZTt/wVZ7O7H1R2z9EifJFpp44MLhnHs5lxPGnBnr+1/e0vLK6tp6YaO4ubW9s1va228YlWhC60RxpVshNpQzSeuWWU5bsaZYhJw2w9H1xG8+UG2Yknd2HNOuwAPJIkawdVK7E4r0MbtP6WnWK5X9ij 8FWiRBTsqQo9YrfXf6iiSCSks4NqYd+LHtplhbRjjNip3E0BiTER7QtqMSC2q66fTlDB07pY8ipd1Ii6bq74sUC2PGInSbAtuhmfcm4r9eKOaSbXTZTZmME0slmQVHCUdWoUkfqM80JZaPHcFEM/c7IkOsMbGutaIrJZivYJE0ziqBXwlu z8vVq7yeAhzCEZxAABdQhRuoQR0IKHiGF3j1nrw37937mK0uefnNAfyB9/kDAomYCA==</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="jqpjbYtTySX4HmdBmaQodQGuMf4=">AAACAnicbVC7SgNBFL3rM8ZX1NJmMAhiEXZF0 MIiYGMZwTwgiWF2MpsMmccyMyuGZTt/wVZ7O7H1R2z9EifJFpp44MLhnHs5lxPGnBnr+1/e0vLK6tp6YaO4ubW9s1va228YlWhC60RxpVshNpQzSeuWWU5bsaZYhJw2w9H1xG8+UG2Yknd2HNOuwAPJIkawdVK7E4r0MbtP6WnWK5X9ij 8FWiRBTsqQo9YrfXf6iiSCSks4NqYd+LHtplhbRjjNip3E0BiTER7QtqMSC2q66fTlDB07pY8ipd1Ii6bq74sUC2PGInSbAtuhmfcm4r9eKOaSbXTZTZmME0slmQVHCUdWoUkfqM80JZaPHcFEM/c7IkOsMbGutaIrJZivYJE0ziqBXwlu z8vVq7yeAhzCEZxAABdQhRuoQR0IKHiGF3j1nrw37937mK0uefnNAfyB9/kDAomYCA==</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="jqpjbYtTySX4HmdBmaQodQGuMf4=">AAACAnicbVC7SgNBFL3rM8ZX1NJmMAhiEXZF0 MIiYGMZwTwgiWF2MpsMmccyMyuGZTt/wVZ7O7H1R2z9EifJFpp44MLhnHs5lxPGnBnr+1/e0vLK6tp6YaO4ubW9s1va228YlWhC60RxpVshNpQzSeuWWU5bsaZYhJw2w9H1xG8+UG2Yknd2HNOuwAPJIkawdVK7E4r0MbtP6WnWK5X9ij 8FWiRBTsqQo9YrfXf6iiSCSks4NqYd+LHtplhbRjjNip3E0BiTER7QtqMSC2q66fTlDB07pY8ipd1Ii6bq74sUC2PGInSbAtuhmfcm4r9eKOaSbXTZTZmME0slmQVHCUdWoUkfqM80JZaPHcFEM/c7IkOsMbGutaIrJZivYJE0ziqBXwlu z8vVq7yeAhzCEZxAABdQhRuoQR0IKHiGF3j1nrw37937mK0uefnNAfyB9/kDAomYCA==</latexit>
electricity dispatch
 g⇤
<latexit sha1_base64="JHz9Dqa1vwv7pcSNcfj6gdEToEU=">AAACAnicbVC7SgNBFL0bXzG+opY2g0EQi7Arg hYWARvLCOYByRpmJ7PJkHksM7NCWNL5C7ba24mtP2LrlzhJttDEAxcO59zLuZwo4cxY3//yCiura+sbxc3S1vbO7l55/6BpVKoJbRDFlW5H2FDOJG1YZjltJ5piEXHaikY3U7/1SLVhSt7bcUJDgQeSxYxg66ROd4CFwA/Z4GzSK1f8qj 8DWiZBTiqQo94rf3f7iqSCSks4NqYT+IkNM6wtI5xOSt3U0ASTER7QjqMSC2rCbPbyBJ04pY9ipd1Ii2bq74sMC2PGInKbAtuhWfSm4r9eJBaSbXwVZkwmqaWSzIPjlCOr0LQP1GeaEsvHjmCimfsdkSHWmFjXWsmVEixWsEya59XArwZ3 F5XadV5PEY7gGE4hgEuowS3UoQEEFDzDC7x6T96b9+59zFcLXn5zCH/gff4ApZOXzg==</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="JHz9Dqa1vwv7pcSNcfj6gdEToEU=">AAACAnicbVC7SgNBFL0bXzG+opY2g0EQi7Arg hYWARvLCOYByRpmJ7PJkHksM7NCWNL5C7ba24mtP2LrlzhJttDEAxcO59zLuZwo4cxY3//yCiura+sbxc3S1vbO7l55/6BpVKoJbRDFlW5H2FDOJG1YZjltJ5piEXHaikY3U7/1SLVhSt7bcUJDgQeSxYxg66ROd4CFwA/Z4GzSK1f8qj 8DWiZBTiqQo94rf3f7iqSCSks4NqYT+IkNM6wtI5xOSt3U0ASTER7QjqMSC2rCbPbyBJ04pY9ipd1Ii2bq74sMC2PGInKbAtuhWfSm4r9eJBaSbXwVZkwmqaWSzIPjlCOr0LQP1GeaEsvHjmCimfsdkSHWmFjXWsmVEixWsEya59XArwZ3 F5XadV5PEY7gGE4hgEuowS3UoQEEFDzDC7x6T96b9+59zFcLXn5zCH/gff4ApZOXzg==</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="JHz9Dqa1vwv7pcSNcfj6gdEToEU=">AAACAnicbVC7SgNBFL0bXzG+opY2g0EQi7Arg hYWARvLCOYByRpmJ7PJkHksM7NCWNL5C7ba24mtP2LrlzhJttDEAxcO59zLuZwo4cxY3//yCiura+sbxc3S1vbO7l55/6BpVKoJbRDFlW5H2FDOJG1YZjltJ5piEXHaikY3U7/1SLVhSt7bcUJDgQeSxYxg66ROd4CFwA/Z4GzSK1f8qj 8DWiZBTiqQo94rf3f7iqSCSks4NqYT+IkNM6wtI5xOSt3U0ASTER7QjqMSC2rCbPbyBJ04pY9ipd1Ii2bq74sMC2PGInKbAtuhWfSm4r9eJBaSbXwVZkwmqaWSzIPjlCOr0LQP1GeaEsvHjmCimfsdkSHWmFjXWsmVEixWsEya59XArwZ3 F5XadV5PEY7gGE4hgEuowS3UoQEEFDzDC7x6T96b9+59zFcLXn5zCH/gff4ApZOXzg==</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="JHz9Dqa1vwv7pcSNcfj6gdEToEU=">AAACAnicbVC7SgNBFL0bXzG+opY2g0EQi7Arg hYWARvLCOYByRpmJ7PJkHksM7NCWNL5C7ba24mtP2LrlzhJttDEAxcO59zLuZwo4cxY3//yCiura+sbxc3S1vbO7l55/6BpVKoJbRDFlW5H2FDOJG1YZjltJ5piEXHaikY3U7/1SLVhSt7bcUJDgQeSxYxg66ROd4CFwA/Z4GzSK1f8qj 8DWiZBTiqQo94rf3f7iqSCSks4NqYT+IkNM6wtI5xOSt3U0ASTER7QjqMSC2rCbPbyBJ04pY9ipd1Ii2bq74sMC2PGInKbAtuhWfSm4r9eJBaSbXwVZkwmqaWSzIPjlCOr0LQP1GeaEsvHjmCimfsdkSHWmFjXWsmVEixWsEya59XArwZ3 F5XadV5PEY7gGE4hgEuowS3UoQEEFDzDC7x6T96b9+59zFcLXn5zCH/gff4ApZOXzg==</latexit>
(cg, dg)
<latexit sha1_base64="wgnLjke1znqOPklJtCmOvNWjVH4=">AAACAXicbVDLSsNAFL2pr1pfVZduBotQQUoig i5cFNy4rGAf2KZlMpmkQyeTMDMRSujKX3Cre3fi1i9x65c4bbPQ1gMXDufcy7kcL+FMadv+sgorq2vrG8XN0tb2zu5eef+gpeJUEtokMY9lx8OKciZoUzPNaSeRFEcep21vdDP1249UKhaLez1OqBvhULCAEayN9FAl/fAM+f3wdFCu2D V7BrRMnJxUIEdjUP7u+TFJIyo04ViprmMn2s2w1IxwOin1UkUTTEY4pF1DBY6ocrPZxxN0YhQfBbE0IzSaqb8vMhwpNY48sxlhPVSL3lT81/OihWQdXLkZE0mqqSDz4CDlSMdoWgfymaRE87EhmEhmfkdkiCUm2pRWMqU4ixUsk9Z5zbFr zt1FpX6d11OEIziGKjhwCXW4hQY0gYCAZ3iBV+vJerPerY/5asHKbw7hD6zPH1kolmw=</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="wgnLjke1znqOPklJtCmOvNWjVH4=">AAACAXicbVDLSsNAFL2pr1pfVZduBotQQUoig i5cFNy4rGAf2KZlMpmkQyeTMDMRSujKX3Cre3fi1i9x65c4bbPQ1gMXDufcy7kcL+FMadv+sgorq2vrG8XN0tb2zu5eef+gpeJUEtokMY9lx8OKciZoUzPNaSeRFEcep21vdDP1249UKhaLez1OqBvhULCAEayN9FAl/fAM+f3wdFCu2D V7BrRMnJxUIEdjUP7u+TFJIyo04ViprmMn2s2w1IxwOin1UkUTTEY4pF1DBY6ocrPZxxN0YhQfBbE0IzSaqb8vMhwpNY48sxlhPVSL3lT81/OihWQdXLkZE0mqqSDz4CDlSMdoWgfymaRE87EhmEhmfkdkiCUm2pRWMqU4ixUsk9Z5zbFr zt1FpX6d11OEIziGKjhwCXW4hQY0gYCAZ3iBV+vJerPerY/5asHKbw7hD6zPH1kolmw=</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="wgnLjke1znqOPklJtCmOvNWjVH4=">AAACAXicbVDLSsNAFL2pr1pfVZduBotQQUoig i5cFNy4rGAf2KZlMpmkQyeTMDMRSujKX3Cre3fi1i9x65c4bbPQ1gMXDufcy7kcL+FMadv+sgorq2vrG8XN0tb2zu5eef+gpeJUEtokMY9lx8OKciZoUzPNaSeRFEcep21vdDP1249UKhaLez1OqBvhULCAEayN9FAl/fAM+f3wdFCu2D V7BrRMnJxUIEdjUP7u+TFJIyo04ViprmMn2s2w1IxwOin1UkUTTEY4pF1DBY6ocrPZxxN0YhQfBbE0IzSaqb8vMhwpNY48sxlhPVSL3lT81/OihWQdXLkZE0mqqSDz4CDlSMdoWgfymaRE87EhmEhmfkdkiCUm2pRWMqU4ixUsk9Z5zbFr zt1FpX6d11OEIziGKjhwCXW4hQY0gYCAZ3iBV+vJerPerY/5asHKbw7hD6zPH1kolmw=</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="wgnLjke1znqOPklJtCmOvNWjVH4=">AAACAXicbVDLSsNAFL2pr1pfVZduBotQQUoig i5cFNy4rGAf2KZlMpmkQyeTMDMRSujKX3Cre3fi1i9x65c4bbPQ1gMXDufcy7kcL+FMadv+sgorq2vrG8XN0tb2zu5eef+gpeJUEtokMY9lx8OKciZoUzPNaSeRFEcep21vdDP1249UKhaLez1OqBvhULCAEayN9FAl/fAM+f3wdFCu2D V7BrRMnJxUIEdjUP7u+TFJIyo04ViprmMn2s2w1IxwOin1UkUTTEY4pF1DBY6ocrPZxxN0YhQfBbE0IzSaqb8vMhwpNY48sxlhPVSL3lT81/OihWQdXLkZE0mqqSDz4CDlSMdoWgfymaRE87EhmEhmfkdkiCUm2pRWMqU4ixUsk9Z5zbFr zt1FpX6d11OEIziGKjhwCXW4hQY0gYCAZ3iBV+vJerPerY/5asHKbw7hD6zPH1kolmw=</latexit>
fidelity &
obfuscated 
gas demands
(yg⇤,xg⇤)
<latexit sha1_base64="oh1vo88iDREcxmexEv/mreKGaro=">AAACE3icbVDLSgMxFM3UV62vUXe6CRahipQZE XThouDGZQX7gHYsmTTThiaZIcmIZRjwJ/wFt7p3J279ALd+iZl2Ftp6IHDuOfdyb44fMaq043xZhYXFpeWV4mppbX1jc8ve3mmqMJaYNHDIQtn2kSKMCtLQVDPSjiRB3Gek5Y+uMr91T6SiobjV44h4HA0EDShG2kg9e6/S9XkyTu+SwX F6ArPiYVoc9eyyU3UmgPPEzUkZ5Kj37O9uP8QxJ0JjhpTquE6kvQRJTTEjaakbKxIhPEID0jFUIE6Ul0z+kMJDo/RhEErzhIYT9fdEgrhSY+6bTo70UM16mfiv5/OZzTq48BIqolgTgaeLg5hBHcIsINinkmDNxoYgLKm5HeIhkghrE2PJ hOLORjBPmqdV16m6N2fl2mUeTxHsgwNQAS44BzVwDeqgATB4BM/gBbxaT9ab9W59TFsLVj6zC/7A+vwBJmWd8Q==</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="oh1vo88iDREcxmexEv/mreKGaro=">AAACE3icbVDLSgMxFM3UV62vUXe6CRahipQZE XThouDGZQX7gHYsmTTThiaZIcmIZRjwJ/wFt7p3J279ALd+iZl2Ftp6IHDuOfdyb44fMaq043xZhYXFpeWV4mppbX1jc8ve3mmqMJaYNHDIQtn2kSKMCtLQVDPSjiRB3Gek5Y+uMr91T6SiobjV44h4HA0EDShG2kg9e6/S9XkyTu+SwX F6ArPiYVoc9eyyU3UmgPPEzUkZ5Kj37O9uP8QxJ0JjhpTquE6kvQRJTTEjaakbKxIhPEID0jFUIE6Ul0z+kMJDo/RhEErzhIYT9fdEgrhSY+6bTo70UM16mfiv5/OZzTq48BIqolgTgaeLg5hBHcIsINinkmDNxoYgLKm5HeIhkghrE2PJ hOLORjBPmqdV16m6N2fl2mUeTxHsgwNQAS44BzVwDeqgATB4BM/gBbxaT9ab9W59TFsLVj6zC/7A+vwBJmWd8Q==</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="oh1vo88iDREcxmexEv/mreKGaro=">AAACE3icbVDLSgMxFM3UV62vUXe6CRahipQZE XThouDGZQX7gHYsmTTThiaZIcmIZRjwJ/wFt7p3J279ALd+iZl2Ftp6IHDuOfdyb44fMaq043xZhYXFpeWV4mppbX1jc8ve3mmqMJaYNHDIQtn2kSKMCtLQVDPSjiRB3Gek5Y+uMr91T6SiobjV44h4HA0EDShG2kg9e6/S9XkyTu+SwX F6ArPiYVoc9eyyU3UmgPPEzUkZ5Kj37O9uP8QxJ0JjhpTquE6kvQRJTTEjaakbKxIhPEID0jFUIE6Ul0z+kMJDo/RhEErzhIYT9fdEgrhSY+6bTo70UM16mfiv5/OZzTq48BIqolgTgaeLg5hBHcIsINinkmDNxoYgLKm5HeIhkghrE2PJ hOLORjBPmqdV16m6N2fl2mUeTxHsgwNQAS44BzVwDeqgATB4BM/gBbxaT9ab9W59TFsLVj6zC/7A+vwBJmWd8Q==</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="oh1vo88iDREcxmexEv/mreKGaro=">AAACE3icbVDLSgMxFM3UV62vUXe6CRahipQZE XThouDGZQX7gHYsmTTThiaZIcmIZRjwJ/wFt7p3J279ALd+iZl2Ftp6IHDuOfdyb44fMaq043xZhYXFpeWV4mppbX1jc8ve3mmqMJaYNHDIQtn2kSKMCtLQVDPSjiRB3Gek5Y+uMr91T6SiobjV44h4HA0EDShG2kg9e6/S9XkyTu+SwX F6ArPiYVoc9eyyU3UmgPPEzUkZ5Kj37O9uP8QxJ0JjhpTquE6kvQRJTTEjaakbKxIhPEID0jFUIE6Ul0z+kMJDo/RhEErzhIYT9fdEgrhSY+6bTo70UM16mfiv5/OZzTq48BIqolgTgaeLg5hBHcIsINinkmDNxoYgLKm5HeIhkghrE2PJ hOLORjBPmqdV16m6N2fl2mUeTxHsgwNQAS44BzVwDeqgATB4BM/gBbxaT9ab9W59TFsLVj6zC/7A+vwBJmWd8Q==</latexit>
dg
<latexit sha1_base64="k nBZ86YqT27Xghgw0gYaS6IY2qg=">AAAB6nicbVBNS8N AEJ34WetX1aOXxSJ4KokIevBQ8OKxov2ANpbNZpIu3Wz C7kYopT/BiwdFvPqLvPlv3LY5aOuDgcd7M8zMCzLBtXHd b2dldW19Y7O0Vd7e2d3brxwctnSaK4ZNlopUdQKqUXCJ TcONwE6mkCaBwHYwvJn67SdUmqfywYwy9BMaSx5xRo2V 7sPHuF+pujV3BrJMvIJUoUCjX/nqhSnLE5SGCap113Mz4 4+pMpwJnJR7ucaMsiGNsWuppAlqfzw7dUJOrRKSKFW2p CEz9ffEmCZaj5LAdibUDPSiNxX/87q5ia78MZdZblCy+ aIoF8SkZPo3CblCZsTIEsoUt7cSNqCKMmPTKdsQvMWXl0 nrvOa5Ne/uolq/LuIowTGcwBl4cAl1uIUGNIFBDM/wCm +OcF6cd+dj3rriFDNH8AfO5w87vY27</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="k nBZ86YqT27Xghgw0gYaS6IY2qg=">AAAB6nicbVBNS8N AEJ34WetX1aOXxSJ4KokIevBQ8OKxov2ANpbNZpIu3Wz C7kYopT/BiwdFvPqLvPlv3LY5aOuDgcd7M8zMCzLBtXHd b2dldW19Y7O0Vd7e2d3brxwctnSaK4ZNlopUdQKqUXCJ TcONwE6mkCaBwHYwvJn67SdUmqfywYwy9BMaSx5xRo2V 7sPHuF+pujV3BrJMvIJUoUCjX/nqhSnLE5SGCap113Mz4 4+pMpwJnJR7ucaMsiGNsWuppAlqfzw7dUJOrRKSKFW2p CEz9ffEmCZaj5LAdibUDPSiNxX/87q5ia78MZdZblCy+ aIoF8SkZPo3CblCZsTIEsoUt7cSNqCKMmPTKdsQvMWXl0 nrvOa5Ne/uolq/LuIowTGcwBl4cAl1uIUGNIFBDM/wCm +OcF6cd+dj3rriFDNH8AfO5w87vY27</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="k nBZ86YqT27Xghgw0gYaS6IY2qg=">AAAB6nicbVBNS8N AEJ34WetX1aOXxSJ4KokIevBQ8OKxov2ANpbNZpIu3Wz C7kYopT/BiwdFvPqLvPlv3LY5aOuDgcd7M8zMCzLBtXHd b2dldW19Y7O0Vd7e2d3brxwctnSaK4ZNlopUdQKqUXCJ TcONwE6mkCaBwHYwvJn67SdUmqfywYwy9BMaSx5xRo2V 7sPHuF+pujV3BrJMvIJUoUCjX/nqhSnLE5SGCap113Mz4 4+pMpwJnJR7ucaMsiGNsWuppAlqfzw7dUJOrRKSKFW2p CEz9ffEmCZaj5LAdibUDPSiNxX/87q5ia78MZdZblCy+ aIoF8SkZPo3CblCZsTIEsoUt7cSNqCKMmPTKdsQvMWXl0 nrvOa5Ne/uolq/LuIowTGcwBl4cAl1uIUGNIFBDM/wCm +OcF6cd+dj3rriFDNH8AfO5w87vY27</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="k nBZ86YqT27Xghgw0gYaS6IY2qg=">AAAB6nicbVBNS8N AEJ34WetX1aOXxSJ4KokIevBQ8OKxov2ANpbNZpIu3Wz C7kYopT/BiwdFvPqLvPlv3LY5aOuDgcd7M8zMCzLBtXHd b2dldW19Y7O0Vd7e2d3brxwctnSaK4ZNlopUdQKqUXCJ TcONwE6mkCaBwHYwvJn67SdUmqfywYwy9BMaSx5xRo2V 7sPHuF+pujV3BrJMvIJUoUCjX/nqhSnLE5SGCap113Mz4 4+pMpwJnJR7ucaMsiGNsWuppAlqfzw7dUJOrRKSKFW2p CEz9ffEmCZaj5LAdibUDPSiNxX/87q5ia78MZdZblCy+ aIoF8SkZPo3CblCZsTIEsoUt7cSNqCKMmPTKdsQvMWXl0 nrvOa5Ne/uolq/LuIowTGcwBl4cAl1uIUGNIFBDM/wCm +OcF6cd+dj3rriFDNH8AfO5w87vY27</latexit>
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Figure 1: Sequential clearing of electricity unit commitment (UC), electricity and natural gas markets.
The objective (4a) of the middle-level problem is to minimize the
electricity dispatch cost, constrained by linearized power flow con-
straints (4b) and bounds on the selected bids z of electricity sup-
pliers (4c). The lower-level problem (5a)–(5c) represents the GM
clearing, which seeks to minimize the natural gas dispatch cost (5a),
constrained by linearized gas flow constraints and the bounds on
natural gas supply and demand bids (5b), as well as the nodal gas
balance equation (5c).
The detailed expressions of these optimization problems, as well
as the matrices Auc , Buc , Ae , Be , Aд , Bд , the vectors cuc , buc , ce ,
be , cд , dд , and the polytopesZuc ,Ze ,Zд is derived from [7] and
provided in the online Appendix [4].
Public and sensitive information. As illustrated in Figure 1
(bottom), the UC problem takes as input the techno-economic char-
acteristics of electricity suppliers, which are represented in Problem
(3) by the matrices Auc and Buc , the vectors cuc and buc , and the
polytopeZuc . As the UC and EM cover the same energy system,
these two agents also take the same parameters as input, which
include the price ce and quantity be bids of electricity suppliers,
electricity demand profile, and electricity network technical char-
acteristics. These parameters are represented in Problem (4) by the
matrices Ae and Be , the vectors ce and be , and the polytope Ze .
Moreover, the UC takes as input the parameters of the the GM fol-
lower, which include the price cд and quantity bids of gas suppliers,
gas demand profile dд , and gas network technical characteristics.
These parameters are represented in Problem (4) by the matricesAд
and Bд , the vectors cд and dд , and the polytopeZд . In particular,
the gas demand profile, dд =
[
d
д
j : ∀j ∈ V
]
at all nodes j ∈ V of
the gas network, represents the sensitive information (referred to
as DS in Problem (1)) of the GM follower.
In contrast, the following outcomes of the GM clearing are tra-
ditionally considered publicly available information: the original
objective value Oд∗ and natural gas prices yд∗ . The mechanism
introduced next will leverage this public information to restore
fidelity of the PPS problem.
5 THE PRIVACY-PRESERVING
STACKELBERG MECHANISM (PPSM)
The Privacy-Preserving Stackelberg Mechanism (PPSM) aims at pro-
tecting the privacy of the gas demand profile dд and achieve the
consistency and fidelity of the obfuscated data dˆд in the context of
the coordination between electricity and natural gas markets.
5.1 Overview
A schematic representation of the mechanism is provided in at the
top of Figure 1. PPSM operates in three phases, described as follows:
(1) The privacy phase takes as input the original, sensitive gas
profile dд , and produces a new, obfuscated, natural gas de-
mand profile d˜д that is α-indistinguishable from dд .
(2) The fidelity phases redistribute the noise introduced in the
privacy phase to obtain a privacy-preserving profile d˜д and
produces a new, privacy-preserving, gas demand profile dˆд
that satisfies the original GM constraints and renders the
GM objective O˜д∗ and/or the GAUC objective O˜uc∗ faithful
to their original counterparts, Oд∗ and Ouc∗ .
(3) Finally, themechanism uses the privacy-preserving and faith-
ful gas demand profile dˆд as input to solve the GAUC prob-
lem introduced in the Section 4.
5.2 Privacy Phase
The PPSM privacy phase takes as input the original vector of gas
demand profile dд and constructs a privacy-preserving version d˜д
using the Laplace mechanism.
Theorem 5.1 (Laplace Mechanism [9]). Let Q be a numeric
query that maps datasets to Rn . The Laplace mechanism that outputs
Q(D) + ξ , where ξ ∈ Rn is drawn from the Laplace distribution
Lap(∆Q /ϵ)n , achieves ϵ-differential privacy.
In the above, Lap(λ) denotes the Laplace distribution with 0 mean
and scale λ, and Lap(λ)n denotes the i.i.d. Laplace distribution over
d dimensions with parameter λ. The Laplace mechanism with pa-
rameter λ = α/ϵ satisfies α-indistinguishability [8]. As a result, the
PPSM: A Privacy-Preserving Stackelberg Mechanism
privacy-preserving gas profile values d˜д are obtained as follows:
d˜д = dд + Lap(α/ϵ)N , (6)
where N is the appropriate dimensionality of the gas profile vector,
α > 0 is the indistinguishability value (e.g., the amount of MWh we
want to protect), and ϵ ≥ 0 is the privacy loss (with typical values
within ln(1.1) to ln(10)). Importantly, the Laplace mechanism has
been shown to be optimal: it minimizes the mean-squared error for
identity queries with respect to the L1-norm [21].
While (6) ensures α-indistinguishability in the ϵ-DP framework,
the obfuscated data may not achieve consistency or strong fidelity
with respect to the original problem. Crucially, demand profiles
generated by thismechanism often fail to produce a feasible solution
to the GAUC problem, as illustrated in Section 7.
5.3 Fidelity Phase
To remedy such limitation, the proposed PPSM introduces an
optimization-based post-processing step that aims at establishing
consistency and fidelity with respect to the agents constraints and
objectives. The goal of the fidelity phase is that of producing a
new gas demand profile dˆд that satisfies the GM constraints and
is faithful to the GM and/or GAUC objective values. Indeed, while
both agents have competing objectives, the PPSM should provide
fidelity guarantees to both agents in order to be applicable.
Therefore this paper introduces two fidelity approaches, one
in which the fidelity criteria focuses on the GM cost, and another
where it focuses on the GAUC cost. As previously discussed, the
original GM cost Oд∗ is traditionally public information, therefore
the PPSM can directly restore fidelity on this value. However, due
to the sequential order of the GAUC and GM clearing, the origi-
nal GAUC cost Ouc∗ is only revealed after the privacy-preserving
data dˆд has been released. Therefore, fidelity on this value cannot
directly be restored. Instead, the original coordination variables,
i.e. the natural gas prices yд∗ are public information. As these co-
ordination variables provide feedback from the GM problem to
the GAUC problem, it is expected that restoring fidelity on these
variables ensures fidelity on the GAUC objective. These two fidelity
approaches are detailed below.
5.3.1 GM cost: Primal fidelity (PPSMp ). The first post-
processing phase aims at restoring feasibility of the natural gas
problem and establishing fidelity of the privacy-preserving GM
objective cost Oˆд = cд⊤xˆд with respect to its counterpart Oд∗
computed using the original demand profile.
However, the solutions and objective of GM problem are affected
not only by the gas demand dд , but also by the gas consumption
xe of GFPPs, which is the solution of the EM problem (see Equa-
tion (5c)). As highlighted in Figure 1, as the GAUC and EM are
cleared after the release of the privacy-preserving data dˆд , histor-
ical data x¯e can be used as input to the optimization-based post-
processing phase in place of a solution xe∗ to the EM problem.
In practice, past observations on the gas and electricity demand
profile can be publicly used to accurately predict the future gas
consumption of GFPPs, denoted xˆe . For the remainder of this paper,
it is assumed that these historical observations provide an accurate
prediction of the future gas consumption.
The Primal fidelity post-processing phase redistributes the noise
introduced by the Laplace mechanism on the obfuscated demand
profile d˜д to generate a new load profile dˆд through the following
bilevel optimization program:
min
dˆд, xˆ д
∥dˆд − d˜д ∥22 (7a)
s.t. |cд⊤xˆд − Oд∗ | ≤ η (7b)
xˆд = primal sol. of Pд(x¯e , dˆд). (7c)
The problem minimizes the distance of the post-processed de-
mand profile dˆд to the Laplace-obfuscated ones d˜д (7a), while en-
forcing fidelity of the objective cost with respect to the original
loads profiles (7b). The public data Oд∗ represents the objective cost
of the GM clearing problem Pд (xˆe ,dд) with the original demand
profile, and collected from historical data. The gas dispatch vari-
ables xˆд are defined in the lower-level problem (7c) as the solution
of the GM clearing problem Pд(xˆe , dˆд) (see Equations (5a) to (5c))
with the post-processed demand profile dˆд . Using the equivalent
Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions of the linear lower-level
problem (7c) and the Fortuny-Amat linearization, this bilevel prob-
lem can be recast as a mixed integer linear program (MILP) [16].
The reformulation is detailed in the online Appendix [4].
5.3.2 GAUC cost: Dual fidelity (PPSMd ). While the fidelity
phase described above enforces fidelity of the GM objective with
respect to the original demand profile, it ignores the impact of the
post-processed data on the UC objective (leader) problem.
To address this limitation, this section introduces an additional
fidelity algorithm that enforces fidelity of the coordination variables
yд . Recall that the GM clearing problem provides feedback to the UC
problem via these coordination variables. Therefore, this approach
allows us to enforce fidelity on both the UC and GM costs. The
resulting fidelity phase redistributes the noise introduced by the
Laplacemechanism on the obfuscated demand profile d˜д to generate
a new load profile dˆд through the following bilevel optimization
program:
min
dˆд, xˆ д,yˆд
∥dˆд − d˜д ∥22 (8a)
s.t. |yˆд − y¯д∗ | ≤ η (8b)
{xˆд , yˆд} = primal and dual sol. of Pд(x¯e , dˆд). (8c)
Similarly to the primal fidelity, this problem seeks to minimize
the distance between the post-processed demand dˆд to the Lapla-
cian obfuscated one d˜д (8a). At the same time, it enforces fidelity
of the coordination variables with respect to the original loads
profiles (8b). The public data y¯д∗ represents the natural gas prices,
associated with the original demand profile. In practice, in order to
ensure transparency of energy markets, this information is indeed
publicly revealed by market operators, as it represents the price
at which energy is bought and sold at each node of the network.
The natural gas dispatch variables xд and prices yˆд are defined
in the lower-level problem (8c) as the primal and dual solutions
of the GM clearing problem Pд(x¯e , dˆд) with the post-processed
demand profile. Similarly to the primal fidelity problem (7), this
bilevel problem can be recast as an MILP.
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Theorem 5.2. For a given ϵ ≥ 0, α > 0, and η > 0, PPSM satisfies
the conditions of the PPS problem (Definition 3.1).
Proof. The privacy phase of PPSM produces a gas demand pro-
file d˜д using the Laplace mechanism with parameter λ = α/ϵ
(Equation (6)). By Theorem 5.1, the resulting demand profile satis-
fies α-indistinguishability for the given privacy parameter ϵ . There-
fore, PPSM satisfies the privacy requirement of the PPS problem
(Definition 3.1).
Notice that the PPSM fidelity phase takes as input the privacy-
preserving gas profiles d˜д generated during the privacy phase, and
uses exclusively the public information—e.g., the problem model
and the historical data xˆe (primal fidelity), or the natural gas prices
y¯д
∗ (dual fidelity). Therefore, by the post-processing immunity
property of differential privacy (Theorem 2.2) the output dˆд of the
fidelity phase satisfies α-indistinguishability.
The PPS fidelity and consistency requirements are ensured di-
rectly by the PPSM fidelity step. In particular the fidelity require-
ment is satisfied by Constraints (7c) and (8b) in the primal and dual
fidelity steps, respectively. The consistency requirement is satisfied
by Constraints (7c) and (8c), in the primal and dual fidelity steps,
respectively. □
6 THE COST OF PRIVACY
The section analyzes the cost of privacy as the impact of the data
perturbation induced by the privacy-preserving mechanism and
the optimal objective cost of the follower agent in the privacy-
preserving problem. The results below hold under the (very mild)
assumption that the historical values xˆe used in the primal and
dual fidelity phases are accurate.
Theorem 6.1. After the fidelity phase, the expected error induced
by PPSMp or PPSMd on the gas demand values dˆд is bounded by the
inequality:
E
[
∥dˆд∗ − dд ∥
]
≤ 4α
2
ϵ2
,
where dˆд
∗
is the solution to Problem (7) or (8), and dд is the original
profile.
The proof of the theorem above is analogous, in spirit, to the
proof of Theorem 5 in [12].
Proof. Denote with d˜д = dд +Lap(α/ϵ) the privacy-preserving
version of the gas demand profile obtained by the Laplace mecha-
nism. We have that:
∥dˆд∗ − dд ∥2 ≤ ∥dˆд∗ − d˜д ∥2 + ∥d˜д − dд ∥2
≤ 2∥d˜д − dд ∥2 ≤ 4α
2
ϵ2
.
The first inequality follows from the triangle inequality on norms.
The second inequality follows from:
∥dˆд∗ − d˜д ∥2 ≤ ∥d˜д − dд ∥2
by optimality of ⟨dˆд∗ , xˆ∗⟩ and the fact that ⟨dд ,x∗⟩ is a feasible
solution to constraints (7b) and (7c) (Problem 7), or, similarly, by
optimality of ⟨dˆд∗ , xˆ∗, yˆ∗⟩ and the fact that ⟨dд ,x∗,y∗⟩ is a feasible
solution to constraints (8b) and (8c) (Problem 8). The third inequality
follows directly from the variance of the Laplace distribution. □
Theorem 6.2. After the fidelity phase, the error induced by PPSMp
on the follower’s objective is bounded in expectation by:
E
[
|Oд∗ − Oˆд∗ |
]
≤ 2
√
2α
ϵ
|yд∗ + η |,
whereyд
∗
represents the natural gas prices of the GM clearing problem
with the original demand profile dд .
While the PPSMp explicitly bounds the cost of privacy in (7b),
Theorem 6.2 shows that the PPSMp also indirectly provides bounds
on the cost of privacy, which are proportional to the sensitivity of
the objective value with respect to the demand.
Proof. The sensitivity of the objective function of the follower
with respect to a small perturbation on the demand is given by the
dual variable yд associated with constraint (5c). As a result, for a
small difference between the original and privacy-preserving gas
demand |dд − dˆд |, the following can be derived:
Oд∗ − Oˆд∗
dд − dˆд
= yˆд
∗
.
Additionally, from Theorem 6.1 the variation on demand profile
|dд−dˆд | in the PPSM is bounded in expectation by 2
√
2α
ϵ
. Therefore,
the difference in optimal objective costs is bounded by
E
[
|Oд∗ − Oˆд∗ |
]
≤ 2
√
2α
ϵ
|yд∗ + η |. (9)
The right-hand side of the expression above follows from the fidelity
constraint (8b). □
7 EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
7.1 Case study setup
The PPSM is evaluated on a test system which is representative of
the joint natural gas and electricity systems in the Northeastern US
[6, 7]. The system is composed of the IEEE 36-bus NPCC electric
power system [2] and a gas transmission network covering the
Pennsylvania-To-Northeast New England area. The unit commit-
ment data for the 91 power plants is derived from the RTO unit
commitment test system [22] based on their technology.
This case study analyzes the performance of the PPSM under
various operating conditions of the gas and electricity systems. The
electricity demand profile is uniformly increased by 30% and 60%,
and the gas demand profile is uniformly increased by 10% up to 130%,
producing increasingly stressed and difficult operating conditions.
Both the primal fidelity and dual fidelity approaches are compared
to the standard Laplace mechanism (which was shown to be optimal
for identity queries [21], like those used in this work), for varying
values of the indistinguishability parameter α ∈ {0.1, 1, 10} × 102
MWh, and the fidelity parameter η ∈ {0.01, 0.1, 10.0}% of the origi-
nal objective value Oд∗ . Notice that the maximal original gas de-
mand vector dд in the highest stress factor adopted, has minimum,
median, and maximum values: 0, 3.38×102, 98.31×102, respectively.
Therefore, the indistinguishability parameters adopted ensure a
very low privacy risk.
We generate 30 repetitions for each test case and report average
results in all experiments. The privacy-preserving mechanisms
(PPSM phases 1 and 2) are implemented in Python 3.0 with Gurobi
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M α sat.(%) ∆d (L1) ∆Ouc (%) ∆Oe (%) ∆Oд (%)
Laplace
0.1 72.61 5.96 0.1564 0.3666 0.3668
1.0 19.76 59.62 1.6065 3.4445 3.4446
10.0 4.28 596.28 21.0501 43.1685 43.1685
PPSMp
0.1 99.29 3.89 0.0139 0.0564 0.0565
1.0 89.90 13.26 0.0570 0.1067 0.1068
10.0 82.38 14.32 0.1235 0.2308 0.2308
PPSMd
0.1 99.28 3.89 0.0130 0.0705 0.0706
1.0 96.38 13.26 0.0536 0.1064 0.1065
10.0 93.95 14.32 0.1193 0.2256 0.2256
Table 1: Left: Satisfactory instances (%) and L1 errors (MWh)
on the gas demands for varying indistinguishability param-
eters α , and η = 0.1% of the GM cost. Right: Errors (%) on the
leader objective (Ouc ) and followers’ objective (Oe and Oд ).
8.1. The GAUC problem (phase 3) uses the c++ implementation of
[7]. A wall-clock limit of 1 hour is given to generate and solve each
of the instances. The resolution of the privacy-preserving demand
profiles (phases 1 and 2 of PPSM) takes less than 30s for any of the
instances.
7.2 Limits of The Laplace Mechanisms
This section studies the applicability to our context of interest of
the Laplace mechanism. Table 1 (left) reports the percentage of
the feasible solutions (over 1170 instances) across different values
of the indistinguishability parameter α . It compares the Laplace
mechanism with PPSMp and PPSMd that use, respectively, the
primal and the dual fidelity phases defined in Section 5.3.1 and Sec-
tion 5.3.2. When the indistinguishability parameter exceeds 0.1 the
Laplace-obfuscated gas demands rarely produce a feasible solution
to the GAUC problem. These results justify the need of studying more
advanced privacy-preserving mechanisms for Stackelberg game prob-
lems, and hence the proposed PPSM. In contrast, the PPSMs result in
a much higher number of feasible solutions. Indeed, all “unsolved”
PPSM cases are due to timeout and not as a direct result of infeasi-
bility. Additionally, we verified that the two PPSMs are always able
to find a feasible solution to the GM problem Pд(x¯e , dˆд).
Table 1 (left) also reports the L1 distance ∆d between the original
gas demand dд and the privacy-preserving versions obtained with
each of the mechanisms analyzed. Unsurprisingly, the L1 errors
increase with the increasing of the indistinguishability parameter
α , as larger indistinguishability induce more noise. However, the
L1 errors introduced by the PPSM are much more contained than
the Laplace ones, producing more than a order of magnitude more
accurate results for the larger indistinguishability parameters. These
results indicate that the highly-perturbed demand profiles induced
by the Laplace mechanism lead to infeasibility in the GAUC and GM
problems, whereas the PPSMs manage to restore consistency of the
post-processed demand profiles.
7.3 Leader and Follower Objectives
The next results evaluate the ability of PPSM to preserve the optimal
objective values of the leader and the follower agents problems.
Table 1 (right) tabulates the errors, in percentage, on the objec-
tive costs of the GAUC problem (leader), the EM problem and the
M η ∆Ouc (%) ∆Oe (%) ∆Oд (%)
Laplace NA 21.0501 43.1685 43.1685
PPSMp
0.1% 0.1152 0.2136 0.2136
1.0% 0.1173 0.2223 0.2222
10.0% 0.1380 0.2567 0.2567
PPSMd
0.1% 0.1109 0.2223 0.2223
1.0% 0.1142 0.2080 0.2079
10.0% 0.1331 0.2469 0.2469
Table 2: Cost objective differences (%) at varying fidelity pa-
rameters η %, and indistinguishability parameter α = 10.
GM problem (followers) at varying indistinguishability parameters
α , and for a fixed fidelity parameter η = 0.1%. The errors ∆O are
defined as |O
∗−O˜∗ |
O %, where O ∈ {Ouc ,Oe ,Oд} and are computed
in expectation over the feasible instances only. Parameter α con-
trols the amount of noise being added to the gas demand profiles,
therefore, the objective costs are closer to their original values when
α is small. Observe that the PPSMs induce objective costs differences
that are from one to two orders of magnitude more accurate that those
induced by the Laplace mechanism, and that are at most 1% of the
original objective costs. Additionally, PPSMd is consistently more
accurate than PPSMp . The reason is that, by enforcing fidelity of
the coordination variables yд , the PPSMd better limits the impact
of the noisy data on the leader objective (GAUC), which in turn
results in more faithful solutions for the followers problems.
These results are further illustrated in Table 2, that analyzes the
difference in objective costs at varying fidelity parameters η, for a
fixed indistinguishability parameter α = 10 (i.e., the largest privacy
level attainable in our experimental setting). Once again, the results
of the PPSM mechanisms are at least two orders of magnitude more
precise than those obtained by the Laplacemechanism. Additionally,
notice that the fidelity parameter η impacts the accuracy of the
privacy-preserving objective costs. Indeed, the fidelity parameter
indirectly controls the deviation of the privacy-preserving GAUC
and GM objectives with respect to the original ones. While the
results differences are small, in percentage, their impact on the
objective functions (which are in the order of 106) is non-negligible.
7.4 Stress Levels Analysis
Finally, this subsection details the effect of the privacy preserving
mechanisms on the combined GAUC problem for all the electricity
and gas stress levels adopted.
Figure 2 reports heatmaps of the total (GAUC and GM) objective
cost difference, in percentage, at varying electricity (e) and gas
(g) stress levels for the privacy preserving data obtained via the
Laplace mechanism (top), PPSMp (middle), and PPSMd (bottom).
Each square represents the objective cost difference averaged over
30 instances for a particular electricity and gas stress level. The
darker the color, the more pronounced are the errors committed by
the mechanisms, as reported in the legends on top of each subfigure.
Gray squares represent the set of instances for which no feasible
solution of the GAUC problem was found or when a timeout is
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Figure 2: Total (GAUC and GM) objective cost difference (%) at varying gas (g) and electricity (e) stress levels for privacy-
preserving data obtained via Laplace Mechanism (top), PPSMp (middle), PPSMd (bottom). Indistinguishably parameters: Left:
α = 0.1, Center: α = 1.0, Right: α = 10.0. Fidelity value η = 0.001%.
reached. The illustration reports the cost differences for indistin-
guishability parameters α = 0.1 (left subfigure) α = 1.0 (middle
subfigure), and α = 10.0 (right subfigure).
These results illustrate three trends: Firstly, they show that, for
every mechanism, the objective differences becomes more pro-
nounced as the electricity and gas stress levels increase. This can
be explained by the increased impact of the Laplace perturbations
on higher values of gas demand profiles. Secondly, they remark
that the PPSMs produce privacy-preserving Stackelberg problems
which are consistently more faithful to the original problems with
respect to those produced by the Laplace mechanism. Finally, they
show that PPSMd is consistently more accurate than PPSMp over
all stress levels. These results are significant, as they show the ro-
bustness of the proposed PPSMs over different electricity and natural
gas demand profiles. They indicate that these PPSMs can provide a
realistic and efficient solution for the coordination of electricity and
natural gas markets.
8 RELATEDWORK
The obfuscation of data values under the lens of differential privacy
is a challenging task that has been studied from several angles.
Often, the released data is generated from a data synopsis in the
form of a noisy histogram [19, 20, 24, 28, 33, 35]. These methods
are typically adopted in the context of statistical queries.
The design of markets for private data has also received consid-
erable attention. For example, Ghosh and Roth design a truthful
mechanism that allows a data analyst to buy information from a
population from which they can estimate some statistic [17]. Niu
et al. study mechanisms to trade noisy aggregate statistics from the
perspective of a data broker in data markets [30].
However, all the proposals above, do not involve data used as
input to a complex optimization problem, as in the case of this
work. The closest work related to the proposal in this paper can be
considered [15], that, in the context energy networks, propose a
privacy-preserving mechanism for releasing datasets that can be
used as input to an optimal power flow problem. A similar line of
work uses hierarchical (bilevel) optimization for obfuscating the
energy network parameters or locations while ensuring high utility
for the problem of interest [13, 14].
In contrast to the aforementioned studies, the proposed PPSM
focuses on solving Stackelberg games in which the followers param-
eters are sensitive. The PPSM also enforces two notions of fidelity
of the privacy-preserving information to the leader and/or follower
objectives. Finally, to the best of our knowledge, this is the first
differentially-private mechanism that is applied to the coordination
of sequential electricity and natural gas markets.
9 CONCLUSIONS
This paper introduced a differentially private mechanism to pro-
tect the sensitive information exchanged during the coordination
of the sequential electricity and natural gas market clearings. The
proposed Privacy-Preserving Stackelberg Mechanism (PPSM) obfus-
cates the gas demand profile exchanged by the gas market, while
also ensuring that the resulting problem preserves the fundamen-
tal properties of the original Stackelberg game. Specifically, the
PPSM was shown to enjoy strong properties: It complies with the
notion of differential privacy and ensures that the outcomes of the
privacy-preserving Stackelberg mechanism are close-to-optimality
for each agent. Experimental results on several gas and electricity
market benchmarks based on a real case study demonstrated the
effectiveness of the approach: The PPSM was shown to obtain up to
two orders of magnitude improvement on the cost of the agents when
compared to a traditional Laplace mechanism.
While the proposed methods were detailed in the context of a
sequential and independent natural gas and electricity market, they
open up various domains of application. For example, the market-
based coordination approach for electricity and district heating
systems proposed in [26, 27], the game-theoretical coordination of
transmission and distribution systems developed in [18, 23, 36], or
the real-time pricing scheme for coordinating the demand response
from aggregators and consumers [29, 37].
Future work will focus on several avenues, including extended
theoretical bounds on the cost of privacy, studying the game-
theoretic properties of this privacy-preserving Stackelberg game,
PPSM: A Privacy-Preserving Stackelberg Mechanism
accounting for uncertainty on the public data, and, studying the
applicability of the PPSM to other domains.
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A NOMENCLATURE
T Time steps in optimization period
V Nodes in gas and electricity networks
Vj Nodes connected to node j
Sj Bids from gas and electricity suppliers at node j
Φuj Time periods with distinct start-up costs of supplier j
Φu, initj Initial up- or down-time periods of supplier j
A Connections in gas network
Av Control valves in gas network departing from node j
Av Compressors in gas network
Ap Pipelines in gas network
at Tail of connection a ∈ A
ah Hail of connection a ∈ A
Φ
↑
jt Minimum up-time of supplier j at time t (h)
Φ
↓
jt Minimum down-time of supplier j at time t (h)
uinitj0 Initial on/off state of supplier j
π j ,π j Pressure bounds at node j at time t (MWh)
ϕ
a
,ϕa Flow bounds of connection a at time t (MWh)
ϕka Discretized values of flow in pipeline a (MWh)
cca , c
c
a Ratio bounds of compressor a
cva , c
v
a Ratio bounds of valve a
Wa , c
v
a Ratio bounds of pipeline a
α j Price parameter of GFPP at node j
cucjb No load cost of supplier at node j (Wh)
cejb Price of electricity bid b at node j (Wh)
c
д
jb Price of electricity bid b at node j (Wh)
dejt Electricity demand at node j and time t (Wh)
d
д
jt Gas demand at node j and time t (Wh)
sejb Quantity bound of electricity bid b at node j
s
д
jb Quantity bound of gas bid b at node j
s
д
j , s
д
j Gas production bounds at node j
Bjk Susceptance of line connecting nodes j and k (S)
f jk Maximum flow in line connecting nodes j and k (Wh)
Table 3: Sets of indexes and parameters in electricity and gas
systems
ujbt Commitment variable of bid b of unit j at time t
v
↑
jt Start-up variable of unit j at time t
v
↓
jt Shut-down variable of unit j at time t
r jt Start-up cost of unit j at time t
sejbt Dispatch of electricity bid b of supplier j at time t (Wh)
s
д
jbt Dispatch of gas bid b of supplier j at time t (Wh)
γ
д
jt Gas consumption of GFPP j at time t (Wh)
qjt Gas load shedding at node j at time t (Wh)
y
д
jt Gas market-clearing price at node j at time t ($/Wh)
Table 4: Primal decision variables of the UC, EM, and GM
clearing problems
B MATHEMATICAL FORMULATIONS
Gas-aware electricity UC problem
The gas-aware electricity UC problem described in Section ?? can
be formulated as follows: As explained in the companion paper, the
upper-level problem represents the heat UC problem, which can be
formulated as follows:
min
∑
t ∈T
∑
j ∈V
©­«cucjt uj0t + r jt +
∑
b ∈Sj
cejbt s
e
jbt
ª®¬ (10a)
s.t. r jt ≥ c↑jh
(
u0jt −
t∑
k=t−h
u0jk
)
,∀j ∈ V, t ∈ T ,h ∈ Φujt (10b)
r jt ≥ 0,∀j ∈ V, t ∈ T (10c)
uj0t = u
init
j ,∀j ∈ V, t ∈ Φu, initj (10d)
t∑
k=t−Φ↑jt+1
v
↑
jk ≤ uj0t ,∀j ∈ V, t ∈ T \ Φu, initj (10e)
t∑
k=t−Φ↓jt+1
v
↑
jk ≤ 1 − uj0(t−Φ↓jt ),∀j ∈ V, t ∈ T \ Φ
u, init
j
(10f)
v
↑
jt −v
↓
jt = uj0t − uj0(t−1),∀j ∈ V, t ∈ T (10g)
ujbt ≤ uj(b−1)t ,∀j ∈ V, t ∈ T ,b ∈ Sj (10h)
v
↑
jt ,v
↓
jt ,uj0t ∈ {0, 1},∀j ∈ V, t ∈ T (10i)
ujbt ∈ {0, 1},∀j ∈ V, t ∈ T ,b ∈ Sj (10j)(
cej(b−1) −Mj
) (
uj(b−1)t − ujbt
)
≥ 2α jyдjt −Mj
,∀j ∈ VGFPP , t ∈ T ,b ∈ Sj (10k)
{sejbt ,y
д
jt } ∈ primal and dual sol. of (11) (10l)
Equations (10b) and (10c) model the start-up cost depending
on the time the units have been offline. Indeed, the expression(
u0jt −
∑t
k=t−h u
0
jk
)
is one when unit j becomes online after it has
been turned off for h time periods. Equation (10d) fixes the initial
minimum up- and down-time of the units. Equations (10e) and (10f)
enforce the minimum up- and down-time, respectively. Equations
(10g) and (10h) state the relationship between the binary variables
for the on-off, start-up, and shut-down statuses of each unit. Equa-
tion (10h) ensures that a bid is selected only if the previous bid
has been selected. Furthermore, Equation (10k) represents the bid-
validity constraints, which ensure that the price of the last selected
bid of each GFPP is greater than their marginal electricity produc-
tion cost. Finally, Equation (10l) represents the feedback from the
primal and dual solutions of the middle- and lower-level problems.
EM clearing problem
min
∑
t ∈T
∑
j ∈V
∑
b ∈Sj
cejbs
e
jbt (11a)
s.t.
∑
b ∈Sj
sejbt
PPSM: A Privacy-Preserving Stackelberg Mechanism
= dejt +
∑
k ∈Vj
Bk j (θmt − θnt ),∀j ∈ IV, t ∈ T (11b)
Bk j
(
θkt − θ jt
) ≤ f k j ,∀j ∈ V,k ∈ Vj , t ∈ T (11c)
sejbuj(b+1)t ≤ sejbt ≤ sej(b−1)ujbt ,∀j ∈ IV,b ∈ Sj , t ∈ T ,
(11d)
Equation (11b) represents the power balance equation at each node
of the power system. Equation (11c) bounds the power flow be-
tween two nodes. The power transmission network is modeled
using the standard linearized DC power flow. Finally, Equation
(11d) represents the upper and lower bound of each selected bid.
GM clearing problem
The GM clearing problem can be formulated as the following opti-
mization problem:
O∗
(
d
д
jt
)
= min
∑
t ∈T
∑
j ∈V
(
c
д
jb s
д
jbt
+ κj qjt
)
(12a)
s .t .
∑
b ∈Sj
s
д
jbt
− dдjt + qjt − γ
д
jt
=
∑
a∈A:j=ah
ϕat −
∑
a∈A:j=at
ϕat ∀j ∈ V, t ∈ T
(12b)
0 ≤ qjt ≤ dдjt ∀j ∈ V, t ∈ T (12c)
s
д
j ≤
∑
b ∈Sj
s
д
jbt
≤ sдj ∀j ∈ V, t ∈ T (12d)
0 ≤ sд
jbt
≤ sдjb ∀j ∈ V,b ∈ Sj , t ∈ T (12e)
ccaπah t ≤ πat t ≤ ccaπah t ∀a ∈ Ac , t ∈ T
(12f)
cvaπah t ≤ πat t ≤ cvaπah t ∀a ∈ Av , t ∈ T
(12g)
πah t − πat t ≥ 2Waϕkaϕat −
(
ϕka
)2
∀a ∈ Ap ,k ∈ {1, ...,K}t ∈ T (12h)
π j ≤ πjt ≤ π j ∀j ∈ V, t ∈ T (12i)
ϕ
a
≤ ϕat ≤ ϕa ∀a ∈ Ap , t ∈ T (12j)
The post-processing steps can be formulated as follows:
dual GM clearing problem
For a given value of the gas demands dˆдjt , using the equivalent
KKT conditions of Problem (12), the lower-level problems in the
post-processing algorithms can be replaced by the following set of
equations:∑
b ∈Sj
s
д
jbt
− dˆдjt + qjt − γjt
=
∑
a∈Hpj
ϕat −
∑
a∈Tpj
ϕat ∀j ∈ V, t ∈ T (13a)
0 ≤ γq
jt
⊥ (−qjt ) ≤ 0 ∀j ∈ V, t ∈ T (13b)
0 ≤ γqjt ⊥
(
qjt − dˆдjt
)
≤ 0 ∀j ∈ V, t ∈ T (13c)
0 ≤ γ s
jt
⊥ ©­«sдj −
∑
b ∈Sj
s
д
jbt
ª®¬ ≤ 0 ∀j ∈ V, t ∈ T (13d)
0 ≤ γ sjt ⊥
©­«
∑
b ∈Sj
s
д
jbt
− sдj
ª®¬ ≤ 0 ∀j ∈ V, t ∈ T (13e)
0 ≤ γ s
jbt
⊥
(
−sд
jbt
)
≤ 0 ∀j ∈ V,b ∈ Sj , t ∈ T (13f)
0 ≤ γ sjbt ⊥
(
s
д
jbt
− sдs
)
≤ 0 ∀j ∈ V,b ∈ Sj , t ∈ T (13g)
0 ≤ µπ
at
⊥ (ccaπah t − πat t ) ≤ 0 ∀a ∈ Ac , t ∈ T (13h)
0 ≤ µπat ⊥
(
πat t − ccaπah t
) ≤ 0 ∀a ∈ Ac , t ∈ T (13i)
0 ≤ µπ
at
⊥ (cvaπah t − πat t ) ≤ 0 ∀a ∈ Av , t ∈ T (13j)
0 ≤ µπat ⊥
(
πat t − cvaπah t
) ≤ 0 ∀a ∈ Av , t ∈ T (13k)
0 ≤ µϕa,t,k ⊥
(
2Waϕkaϕat −
(
ϕka
)2 − πah t + πat t ) ≤ 0
∀a ∈ Ap ,k ∈ {1, ...,K}t ∈ T (13l)
0 ≤ γ π
jt
⊥
(
π j − πjt
)
≤ 0 ∀j ∈ V, t ∈ T (13m)
0 ≤ γ πjt ⊥
(
πjt − π j
) ≤ 0 ∀j ∈ V, t ∈ T (13n)
0 ≤ γϕ
at
⊥
(
ϕ
a
− ϕat
)
≤ 0 ∀a ∈ Ap , t ∈ T (13o)
0 ≤ γϕat ⊥
(
ϕat − ϕa
)
≤ 0 ∀a ∈ Ap , t ∈ T (13p)
c jb − yдjt − γ sjt + γ
s
jt − γ sjbt + γ
s
jbt = 0 ∀j ∈ V,b ∈ Sj , t ∈ T
(13q)
κj − yдjt − γqjt + γ
q
jt = 0 ∀j ∈ V, t ∈ T (13r)
− γ π
jt
+ γ πjt +
∑
a∈Tcj
(
−µπ
at
+ µπat
)
+
∑
a∈Hcj
(
ccaµ
π
at
− ccaµπat
)
+
∑
a∈Tvj
(
−µπ
at
+ µπat
)
+
∑
a∈Hvj
(
cva µ
π
at
− cva µπat
)
+
K∑
k=1
©­­«
∑
a∈Tpj
µ
ϕ
a,t,k −
∑
a∈Hpj
µ
ϕ
a,t,k
ª®®¬ = 0 ∀j ∈ V, t ∈ T (13s)
y
д
ah t − y
д
at t +
K∑
k=1
2Waϕka µa,t,k − γ
ϕ
at
+ γ
ϕ
at = 0
∀a ∈ Ap , t ∈ T (13t)
Equations (13a)-(13p) represent in a compact form the primal and
dual constraints, and the complementarity conditions of Problem
(12). Equations (13q)-(13t) represent the stationarity conditions of
Problem (12). Furthermore, the bilinear complementarity conditions
in (13b)-(13p) can be linearized, by using disjunctive constraints.
Therefore the post-processing problems can be recast as mixed
integer second order cone programs (MISOCP).
